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INTRODUCTION 
The Trial Court's grant of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was in error and must be reversed. The trial court 
erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
because Defendants filed no sworn affidavits or other 
pleadings in support of their Motion. The trial court further 
erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
because the Affidavits and exhibits filed by the Plaintiffs 
indicate a clear dispute of material fact. Finally, the trial 
court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment because Defendants' licensing argument is irrelevant 
to this dispute. It proves, at most, that Defendants acted in 
violation of licensing laws, as well as contract laws, when 
they terminated Plaintiff Watters. 
ARGUMENT 
A Party Moving for Summary Judgment 
Has the Burden to Support the Motion 
with Affidavits or other Evidence. 
The trial court erred in granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment because the Defendants filed no pleadings, 
affidavits, or other adequate proof in support of their 
Motion. The party moving for Summary Judgment has the initial 
burden of proof to establish, with Affidavits or other 
competent evidence, that they are entitled to Summary 
1 
Judgment. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56; Utah Code of 
Judicial Procedure. 4-501 (1)(a) . Because the Defendants 
filed no evidence in support of their motion it was plain 
error for the trial court to grant them Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff began this case by filing a Verified Complaint, 
wherein she stated on information and belief that Defendant 
Karen Allred had assumed ownership of the LakeCrest/Mesa Vista 
facility (hereinafter, facility) sometime in February, 1992. 
According to Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Defendants 
immediately took over operation of the facility, and assumed 
responsibility for all assets and liabilities of the facility. 
Plaintiff later filed an Amended Complaint, adding Mesa Vista, 
Inc. as a named party. 
Defendants have yet to file an answer in this matter. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was a legal, not factual 
document, and is irrelevant to the issues raised herein. In 
response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Watters filed a 
sworn Affidavit, wherein she stated that: 
Sometime during January or February 1992 Karen 
Allred called a meeting of all head staff and indicated 
that she was negotiating to purchase the LakeCrest and 
Rocky Mountain Centers, in order to avoid having them 
shut down. During the first part of March, 1992, Ms. 
2 
Allred indicated to us that she was the new owner of the 
facilities.(R.154-163) 
In their "Response and Motion to Convert [their 12(b)(6) 
Motion] to a Motion for Summary Judgment" (hereinafter, 
Response & Motion) Defendants alleged that Plaintiff had sued 
the wrong parties. Defendants alleged that Mesa Vista Inc., 
not Karen Allred, had purchased the facilty, and that Mesa 
Vista Inc. had not taken over the facility until April of 
1992. Defendants purported to support this claim by the 
"Declaration of Defendant Karen Allred."(R.226-230)1 This 
unsworn "Declaration," and the additional documents attached 
to it, were the only evidence submitted by the Defendants in 
support of their contention that Mesa Vista was not the owner 
or operator of the facility at the time Watters was 
terminated. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that, 
to have sufficient evidentiary weight, testimony given in 
support of a Motion for Summary Judgment must be presented in 
affidavit or deposition form. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
56(e). Affidavits must be taken before "any judge, the clerk 
of any court, any justice court judge, or any notary public in 
1
 Defendant Karen Allred resumed the use of her maiden 
name, Karen Widman, sometime during the course of this action. 
She has signed some documents as Karen Allred and other 
documents as Karen Widman. 
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this state." Utah Code §78-26-5. Unlike other jurisdictions, 
Utah has no provision for unsworn, unnotarized, statements or 
declarations. 
The Utah Supreme Court reviewed the standard for 
determining plain error in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d. 12 01 
(1993). The Court stated that, in order to prevail, the 
appellant must show that 
(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e, absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. 
Id, at 1208-1209. 
In the present case, it was plain error for the trial court to 
grant Defendants7 Motion for Summary Judgment when the 
Defendants had not filed any sworn testimony, notarized or 
certified copies, or any other evidence adequate to support 
their Motion. 
The error should have been obvious to the trial court—a 
simple glance at the Docket Sheet in this matter would have 
revealed that, while Watters had filed both a Verified 
Complaint and various sworn Affidavits, Defendants had filed 
no Affidavits, no Answer, and no other sworn testimony. 
Furthermore, had the trial court properly reviewed the 
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Pleadings and other papers submitted prior to oral argument on 
the summary judgment motion, it should have recognized the 
legal inadequacy of Defendant Allred's "Declaration." 
Finally, had the trial court properly recognized this error, 
it would have denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on this issue, thereby granting Watters a more favorable 
outcome. 
Because Allred's unsworn "Declaration" was legally 
inadequate under Utah law to support Defendants' factual 
allegations, and because there was no other properly sworn 
testimony on which to grant Defendants' Motion, the trial 
court erred when it granted Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
The record indicates that material facts are disputed. 
Furthermore, the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because there are 
material facts in dispute. Even assuming, for purposes of 
this section, that Allred's "Declaration" and all the 
supporting documentation submitted by both sides are 
sufficient for evidentiary purposes, the record indicates a 
material disputed fact regarding whether or not Mesa Vista was 
in control of the facility, through administrator Allred, on 
5 
or before March 18, 1992, when Watters was terminated. The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that: 
A motion for summary judment can only be granted 
when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact," 
and "even assuming the facts as asserted by the party 
moved against to be true, he could not prevail." Gadd v. 
Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Utah 1984) [quotations in the 
original]. 
Plaintiff Watters stated in her Verified Complaint that on 
March 18, 1992 she was wrongfully placed on probation from her 
job, and that by March 25, 1992 she had been demoted, offered 
only alternative jobs she was physically unable to do, and 
constructively fired. (R.7-9) Watters restated these 
allegations with additional detail in her Affidavit, filed in 
support of her Objection to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss.(R.154-163) For purposes of this appeal, these facts 
must be accepted as stated, because they are the facts as 
asserted by the party moved against. Copper State Leasing Co. 
v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co. . 770 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988). 
Watters has also alleged that Defendant Karen Allred, 
acting through the corporate entity of Mesa Vista Inc., 
purchased the facility from Vali Division of Wasatch (Vali) on 
or before March 18, 1992.(R.9-10; R.162). 
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The question of whether Allred, as administrator of the 
facility, was acting on behalf of Vali or Mesa Vista when she 
demoted and constructively terminated Watters after March 18, 
1992 is a disputed issue of material fact. Watters has stated 
in both her Verified Complaint and in her Affidavit in Support 
of her Objection to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, that Allred 
personally stated to facility employees sometime in February 
or March of 1992 that she had "purchased the facility.11 
In support of her argument that the Allred purchased and 
began running the facility on or before March 18, 1992, 
Watters also filed a copy of a sworn affidavit Allred had 
submitted to the Fourth District Court in another case. In 
that affidavit, Allred herself states, under oath, that "On 
March 18, 1992 I reached an Agreement with Vali Division of 
Wasatch to purchase the business through Mesa Vista Inc., a 
non-profit Utah corporation."(R.141). 
Watters also submitted, as further evidence that Allred 
was acting on behalf of Mesa Vista, not Vali, after March 18, 
1992, a copy of Allred7s Licensing Application, submitted to 
the Utah Department of Health Facilities Licensure. (R.105-
108; also R.221-224). In that application, Allred indicates 
that she is applying on behalf of Mesa Vista for permission to 
operate the facility beginning March 18, 1992. Allred further 
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indicates, in the Notice of Intent submitted with the 
Licensing Application, that Mesa Vista intended to "Assume 
ownership of a currently licensed" facility, and that the 
anticipated completion date of the action Noticed was March 
18, 1992. (R.221) Twice in this application Allred indicates 
that she is the facility Administrator for Mesa Vista. (R.108; 
R.106). 
Finally, the fact, as stated in Watters' Affidavit 
(R.155) and supported with a copy of Mesa Vista's Articles of 
Incorporation, (R.128) that Watters was replaced, on March 19, 
1992, by Marta Whitington, then a director of Mesa Vista, 
further supports Watters7 claim that Allred was acting on 
behalf of Mesa Vista not Vali, when she suspended Watters, and 
constructively terminated her between March 18 and March 25, 
1992. 
As has been discussed previously, in opposition to the 
above documents submitted with Watters7 Objection to their 
Motion to Dismiss, Defendants filed the unsworn "Declaration" 
of Defendant Karen Allred. In that Declaration, Allred states 
that "Mesa Vista, Inc. assumed the operation of the ICF/MR 
[facility] on April 1, 1992." (R.229). Allred further states 
that, previous to April 1, 1992, the facility was operated by 
Vali Division of Wasatch. 
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In her Motion to Reconsider, later withdrawn and re-
submitted as a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Watters submitted 
additional evidence on this issue, in the form of a sworn 
Affidavit from Lee Bangerter, Secretary of Vali Division of 
Wasatch, stating that as of March 18, 1992, Vali ceased to 
excercise control over the facility. (R.335-336; R.406-408) 
Watters also submitted a copy of Allred's cover letter to Mesa 
Vista's license application. (R.424) This cover letter, dated 
March 18, 1992, clearly indicates to the Department of Health 
Facilities Licensure that Allred is acting on behalf of Mesa 
Vista, not Vali. The letter also states at several places 
that on March 18, 1992, Mesa Vista was operating the facility, 
and had assumed all contracts and other liabilities previously 
held by Vali. 
In response to the Affidavit of Mr. Bangerter, Defendants 
submitted a second unsworn, "Declaration" by Defendant Allred. 
Although Watters objected to the unsworn nature of this 
Declaration in her Response to Defendants' Objection, the 
trial court appears to have ignored Watters' objection in 
weighing the evidence. In this Declaration, Allred alleges, 
in summary, that Vali, through Bangerter, did exercise control 
over the facility, because Bangerter's signature, or signature 
blank, was required to cash checks over $2,500.00 on the 
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facility checking account. Allred further alleges that she 
continued to request Mr. Bangerter's approval to use his 
signature blank when she wrote checks over that amount through 
April, 1992. (R.373-375) 
Defendants claim in their brief on appeal that they never 
employed Watters. Watters has never contended that she was 
hired by Mesa Vista. However, when Mesa Vista took over 
control of the facility, Watters was a contractual employee, 
and Defendants in purchasing the business accepted 
responsibility and liability for that contract. The fact that 
Watters was immediately suspended, replaced by a member of the 
board of directors of Mesa Vista, and finally forced to quit 
because she was only offered substitute work beyond her 
physical abilities, does not alter the fact that her 
suspension and constructive discharge were done on behalf of 
whoever was operating the facility on the dates of her 
suspension and constructive termination. The issue of which 
corporate entity was responsible between March 18, 1992 and 
March 25, 1992 (or April 1, 1992) is a disputed issue of 
material fact. 
Because Watters is the party opposing summary judgment, 
the facts must be viewed in her favor. Assuming the facts to 
be as Watters has stated them, Defendants purchased the 
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facility, and assumed the responsibility for all liabilities 
and assets, including Watters' employment contract, on or 
before March 18, 1992, the date Watters has alleged she was 
wrongfully put on the probation that led to her constructive 
termination. Because the facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Watters, would support a judgment on her behalf, 
this case must be reversed and remanded for trial on the 
merits. 
Defendants' Licensing Argument is Irrelevant 
Finally, this case must be reversed because Defendants' 
argument that they were not licensed to run the facility prior 
to March 25th or April 1st is irrelevant to the determinative 
issues. This argument is analogous to a teenager claiming 
that "I couldn't have hit the pedestrian last night, because 
I didn't get my driver's license until today." As this 
analogy makes clear, the relationship between licensing 
regulations and the underlying factual issues is non-existent. 
Whether Mesa Vista was properly licensed is irrelevant to a 
determination of whether Mesa Vista, through its agent Karen 
Allred, was actually running the facility on the dates of 
Watters' wrongful constructive termination. 
Defendants have cited various sections of the Utah Code 
in support of their argument that they were not licensed to 
11 
operate the facility until, at the earliest, March 25, 1992. 
Defendants, in citing these sections, apparently seek to 
present the issue as a matter of law. According to 
Defendants, they were not properly licensed to run the 
facility, therefore, as a matter of law, they could not have 
been running the facility. The absurdity of this argument is 
made clear by the previous analogy. Watters does not contend 
that the Defendants were licensed to operate the facility 
prior to that date. Watters does contend, however, that 
regardless of proper licensing procedures, Defendant Allred 
was operating the facility on behalf of Mesa Vista when she 
acted to terminated Watters between March 18, 1992 and March 
23, 1992. 
CONCLUSION 
This case should be reversed and remanded to the trial 
court. The trial court erred when it granted Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, because the Defendants completely 
failed to file the required Affidavits or other legally 
sufficient evidence in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Furthermore, the record indicates a disputed issue 
of material fact regarding the corporation actually in charge 
of the facility on the dates of Watter's constructive wrongful 
discharge. Finally, Defendants' licensing argument is 
12 
irrelevant, and has no probative value. Therefore, Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that this court reverse and remand this 
case for further action. 
DATED this of January, /1995^  
*TI L. JONES" 
ATTORNEY ^OR APPELLANT, 
SUE ELLEN WATTERS 
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